Interesting, I had missed this spat. Very entertaining, although I agree with Romans holiday that it is also a tad worrisome.
If this is the level of intellectual discourse they are capable of, I'm glad neither of them are actually making decisions for us. Things are neither as black and white as models dictate (Krugman) or as historical analogous reasoning implies (Ferguson). Both can be utterly wrong, but neither is willing to admit it. Both *want* to be right, instead of looking for a practical and near-optimal solution that satisfies multiple issues. That's a dangerous sign, in my opinion.
Further than that, I think their disagreement stems from different back argumentation paths. They have different in many ways (using
Toulmin's argumentation model):
* Claim -Krugman we should stimulate. Ferguson: we should reduce the fiscal gap.
* Grounds - K: Cost of human suffering will be great in a deep protracted downturn. F: Growing fiscal debt destroys US credibility.
* Warrants - K: Data/model show that stimulus reduces severity of downturn. F: History shows that stimulus grows fiscal debt dangerously.
* Backing - K: Reduction of suffering is important (pareto optimum). F: Clearing bad debt / avoiding currency crash is tantamount
* Qualifier - K: We don't want another Great Depression. F: We don't want another Japan's 90s
* Rebuttal - K: Laissez-Faire didn't work. F: Keynes was wrong.
(BTW, above are their arguments, not mine)
I don't know who's right or wrong, but I can give you an example, which is not directly analogous due to structural differences. But it does illustrate the difference between the two possible paths argued by the men above, neither of whom have actually experienced/lived either of the options. As such, I consider their 'expertise' to be bit on the side of arm-chair philosophy.
In the 90s
Scandinavian deep depression Finland just cut everything in a really quick/efficient way and many banks went bankrupt. The result was huge unemployment (much of this remains structural almost 20 years later), thousands of healthy companies going bankrupt in addition to the bad ones, suicides shot through the roof (initially), poverty increased, all services were cut and child/youth mental health problems exploded.
In contrast, Sweden had a mild recession, recovered rapidly through it's import capacity (which wasn't bankrupted), got rid of the unemployment before it turned totally structural and was able to use government spending/schooling to divert the changes in the economy towards future structural adjustments. Granted, Finnish banks are now among the world's top rated in terms of security/safety by Global Finance and Finnish government debt is considered the safest after Norway, which is swimming in oil saving money. However, Swedish banks/debt is equally good. But both countries were still equally badly prepared for this current bubble and now Finland again is being hit harder - in fact, utterly devastated in terms of industry/employment.
I know this, because I lived this time and have read too many analyses of the reasons and decisions of/in these depressions. This left deep scars in the psyche of the country, but they didn't avoid us from getting caught in this current bubble. I'm beginning to side with the Austrians/Keynes both of whom thought that bubbles are inevitable.
Do I think that Sweden did worse or better than Finland? Well, their downturn was less harsh and not as much structural damage was done to their economy. Their banks faired better in the sense that their debts were cleaned and most of the banks stayed in business (and in fact ended up buying Finnish ones).
Wish I knew what the right ultimate hard-line answer was. Maybe neither? Probably something in between, as silly as it may sound to hard-liners. But I admit it's a question of values: in times of trouble does short-term suffering of the poorest matter and if so, how much.
People don't agree on the basic questions of morals, so I don't think their ever going to agree on the whole question of stimulus or not.As for
investing, I think it's going to be hard stimulus first (like so far), then a fairly rapid winding down of that in successive stimuli, even if short-term interest rates are kept fairly low. Good luck in investing in that climate. I'm expecting something like the manic swings hypothesis to play out. So far. As decisions change, so does my position.